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Abstract
We provide new empirical insights on the joint distribution of consumption, income,
and wealth using cross-sectional and panel household-survey data from three of the poorest
countries in the world—Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda—all located in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). Our main contribution is to establish the co-existence of two phenomena in SSA:
(i) a low transmission from income inequality to wealth inequality (i.e., low accumulation);
and (ii) a low transmission from income inequality to consumption inequality (i.e., high
consumption insurance). The variation between rural and urban areas in SSA—and between
SSA and the U.S.—reveals a negative relationship and, potentially, a trade-off between
accumulation and consumption insurance.
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1 Introduction
Facts on the distributions of consumption, income, and wealth (CIW) are readily available for a
large set of modern industrialized economies (Krueger et al., 2010; D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011;
Piketty, 2014). These facts have been extensively used to build and test macroeconomic theories
that incorporate heterogeneous household behavior with some degree of market incompleteness
for the study of, almost invariably, rich economies.1 To understand whether these macroeconomic
frameworks are useful also for poor countries they need to be fully contextualized and informed by
the behavior of households in these countries. In this paper we provide a careful and systematic
dissection of the CIW behavior of rural and urban households in three of the poorest countries
in the world—Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. To this end we use new and unique nationally
representative data from the Integrated Surveys of Agriculture (ISA). Unlike most of the previous
Living Standards Measurement Studies (LSMS), ISA not only includes cross-sectional data but
also a panel dimension that we exploit.2,3
The main contribution of this paper is to exploit the rare availability of the triplet CIW and
use the variation across rural and urban areas in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and across SSA and
the US, to establish the coexistence of two main findings that has not been previously emphasized
in the literature: (i) a low transmission from income to wealth and (ii) a low transmission from
income to consumption. We provide both cross-sectional evidence (e.g., conditional distributions)
and panel-data evidence (e.g., complete markets tests a` la Townsend (1994)) of these two findings.
The two findings together imply that there is a negative relationship—and potentially a trade-off—
between wealth accumulation and consumption insurance. Such potential trade-off is particularly
important for rural areas where wealth accumulation is unambiguously low and consumption
insurance is unambiguously high.
Our first main finding is a low transmission from income inequality to wealth inequality, i.e.,
a large and widespread inability to accumulate wealth conditional on income. This is the case
in both rural and, to a lesser extent, urban areas of the three countries that we study in SSA.4
1See a recent review in Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2015) and an earlier overview in R´ıos-Rull (1995).
2The panel data are available in two waves for Malawi (2010/11 and 2013), four waves for Uganda (2005/6,
2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12), and two waves for Tanzania (2008 and 2010).
3To gain perspective on the relative poverty of the countries in this study, note that their average income per
capita per day is close to US$1 (annually, US$359 in Malawi, US$524 in Tanzania, and US$471 in Uganda in 2010).
Indeed, Malawi is the poorest world country in terms of income per capita according to the World Development
Indicators (data retrieved in 2010). The rural population, where the overwhelming majority lives (84% in Malawi,
71% in Tanzania, and 85% in Uganda), has even lower levels of income per capita. In comparison, the poorest
country studied in Krueger et al. (2010) is Mexico, which has an income per capita of US$8,920 and a rural
population that is 22% of the total un 2010. In Thailand, a country extensively investigated in the development
literature, these figures are respectively US$4,802 and 56% in 2010.
4For brevity, we refer to the three countries that we study as SSA. When we report a precise number for SSA,
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We provide cross-sectional evidence of this phenomenon in four different ways. First, the ratio of
wealth inequality to income inequality is much lower in SSA (1.5 in variance of logs) than in the
US (4.5). This ratio is also lower in rural areas than in urban areas of SSA. These results hold
for alternative measures of inequality. Second, the correlation of income and wealth is lower in
SSA (0.29) than in the US (0.57), and lower in rural areas than in urban areas of SSA. Third, the
lifecycle profile of wealth accumulation shows similar insights. While in the US wealth increases
by a factor of 20 from age 25 to its peak, wealth increases by a much smaller factor in SSA:
respectively 1.5 and 6 in rural and urban areas. The main component of household wealth, land
holdings, largely explains this behavior with a lifecycle growth between age 25 and its peak of
a factor of 1.5. The component of wealth that shows the strongest accumulation is livestock
that grows by a factor of 3 over the lifecycle, a reminiscent of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)
for India.5 Fourth, we study the wealth distribution conditional on income. Whereas the top 1%
income-richest in the US hold 26% of total household wealth, the top 1% income-richest in SSA
hold much less accumulated wealth: 4% of total rural wealth and 11% of total urban wealth.
Our second main finding is a high level of consumption insurance in SSA, particularly in rural
areas (Townsend, 1994; Kinnan, 2014). We provide cross-sectional evidence of this phenomenon
in four different ways. First, the ratio of consumption inequality to income inequality, a first pass
to measure consumption insurance (Krueger and Perri, 2006; Morten, 2013), is much lower in
SSA (0.43 in variance of logs) than in the US (0.81). Second, the correlation between income
and consumption is lower in the SSA (0.53) than in the US (0.63), and lower in rural SSA (0.37)
than in urban SSA (0.67). Our third form of evidence is the lifecycle behavior of consumption.
In SSA, the pattern of lifecycle consumption shows a hump; as previously reported for other
countries (Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Attanasio et al., 1999; Storesletten et al., 2004). The peak
is twice larger in urban areas than in rural areas of SSA. This suggests a larger ability to smooth
consumption over the lifecycle in rural areas (De Magalha˜es et al., 2017). Fourth, we explore
distribution of consumption conditional on income and wealth. The consumption distribution
conditional on income (or wealth) is more evenly distributed in SSA than in the US. Precisely,
the bottom 20% of the land distribution accounts for 20% of total consumption and the top 20%
accounts for 25% of total consumption. That is, land is likely to serve as an ex-ante redistribution
mechanism that helps explain the high degree of consumption insurance suggested by the data.
Our analysis with panel data corroborates and extends our cross-sectional findings. First,
income-rich households in SSA, despite having similar saving rates as the income-rich households
in the US, are not income-rich for long enough, compared with their US counterparts, to accu-
that number relates to Malawi. Tanzania and Uganda show similar insights with details in the Online Appendix.
5However, despite this accumulation, livestock remains below 20% of total household wealth at age 65 while
this proportion is 40% for land.
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mulate similar wealth. That is, there is substantially more income mobility in SSA than in the
US. Analogously, within SSA there is larger income mobility in rural areas than in urban areas,
which helps explain the lower ability to accumulate wealth in rural areas compared with urban
areas. This result arises from both income mobility matrices and the predicted income ranking of
households. Both methods show larger upward as well as larger downward mobility in SSA than
in the US. Second, using the joint panel of household-level consumption and income we compute
insurance tests a` la Townsend. These panel-based tests show higher consumption insurance in
rural areas than in urban areas of SSA. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis of complete
markets in rural areas when we define consumption as caloric intake, while this hypothesis is
strongly rejected in urban areas.
The higher ability to insure in rural areas compared with urban areas is also apparent from
self-reported information about shocks (e.g., weather, health, prices) and coping strategies (i.e,
self-insurance, mutual insurance, or no response). Households in rural areas report using an
informal insurance mechanism—conditional on having reported a shock—more often than urban
households. This is suggestive, again, of a better ability to obtain insurance in rural areas than in
urban areas. In terms of formal borrowing, we find that the success rate conditional on needing
a loan is 17% in rural areas and 30% in urban areas. This way, the ability to formally borrow,
proxied with conditional success rates on formal borrowing, is roughly twice larger in urban areas
than in rural areas. However, this does not translate into higher consumption insurance in urban
areas compared with rural areas. The reason is that formal borrowing in urban areas is 3.6 times
more likely to be used for start-up capital (e.g., opening a business) than for consumption, while
this ratio is 1.6 in rural areas. This suggests that urban households give up consumption insurance
for accumulation (and growth) more often than rural households.
Our paper relates to a vast literature in growth and development economics. First, the
patterns of low wealth accumulation in SSA relative to the US, which we study using micro data,
are also present using aggregate data (Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997; Caselli, 2005). From
a micro perspective, the facts that we document on the inability to accumulate wealth in SSA
are directly related to the experimental work in Dupas and Robinson (2013a,b) for Kenya and in
Brune et al. (2015) for Malawi. Both studies provide specific evidence of saving constraints that
prevent accumulation. Second, the notion that the poor have strong institutions that preserve
the ability to insure consumption is well-understood (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Townsend,
1994; Attanasio and R´ıos-Rull, 2000). We contribute to this literature by providing novel cross-
sectional and panel evidence of a weaker transmission from consumption to income inequality
in the rural areas than in the urban areas of SSA. The phenomenon of a differential ability to
insure consumption in rural areas versus urban areas has been previously explored (Harris and
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Todaro, 1970; Morten, 2013; Bryan et al., 2014; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016; Santaeula`lia-
Llopis and Zheng, 2018). Finally, our paper relates to a growing literature that uses micro data
to understand macro development (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Buera and Shin, 2011; Lagakos and
Waugh, 2013; Gollin et al., 2014; Lagakos et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017). Our contribution is
to empirically study the joint behavior of the distributions of CIW in a manner that we hope is
informative to discipline heterogeneous agent versions of macroeconomic models of growth and
development (Galor and Weil, 1999; Hansen and Prescott, 2002; Gollin et al., 2002; Herrendorf
et al., 2014).
In Section 2, we describe the data construction of household consumption, income, and wealth.
In Section 3, we study the transmission from income to wealth and from income to consumption
separately for rural and urban areas in SSA. We also establish comparisons between SSA and
the US. We investigate the univariate distributions of CIW in Section 3.1, the joint distributions
in Section 3.2, the lifecycle behavior in Section 3.3 and the behavior of the top and bottom of
the distributions in Section 3.4. We provide detailed insights from panel data studying income
mobility and consumption insurance tests in Section 4. We also investigate self-reported risks,
insurance mechanisms, and formal borrowing. We conclude in Section 5.
2 ISA Data and Measurement Issues
The Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (ISA) allow us to recover—for any practical purpose—the
entire deseasonalized budget constraint of a household in the poorest countries of SSA.6 The
budget constraint offers a simple way to organize the data for the study of CIW inequality,
c+ k′ = ya + yl + yb + yk + k + ta + tm, (1)
where c is consumption, ya is agricultural production, yl is labor income, yk is capital income, yb
is business income, ta are food transfers, tm are monetary transfers, k represents wealth today
and k′ wealth tomorrow. All this information regarding CIW is fully available in our data set, an
availability that is very scarce even in rich countries with few notable exceptions (Krueger and
Perri, 2011; Krueger et al., 2017).7
6The Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (ISA) are conducted under the umbrella of the Living Standards
Measurement Study (LSMS). See a comprehensive introduction to ISA in the Online Appendix A.
7The availability of consumption, income, and wealth (CIW) in one single dataset is a rarity in the US and
other rich countries. For example, in the US, the consumption expenditure survey (CEX) is widely used to study
the joint dynamics of consumption and income (but without wealth data) (Krueger and Perri, 2006) and the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is commonly used to study the joint dynamics of income and wealth (but
without consumption data) (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011). Since year 2000 the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
(PSID) extends its collection of household consumption data (beyond food) capturing a larger basket, which
together with income and wealth data allows study the joint dynamics of CIW in the US (Krueger et al., 2017).
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Due to the economic structure of the poor countries that we study, caution should be exercised
in some aspects of our analysis, in particular, related to the income data. In this direction, we
discuss in detail important measurement issues such as deseasonalization, units conversion of
in-kind items, and the value of unsold agricultural production, as well as the implications of
potential data limitations or sources of measurement error (e.g., underreporting and recall bias)
on our main results; see our Appendix for details.
2.1 Household consumption
The main expenditure item is food that accounts for 62% of household expenditure. The ISAs
record food consumption that is purchased, self-farmed, and received as gifts. Our measure
of food expenditure includes food purchases, self-farmed consumption, and received food gifts.
To construct this measure we attach consumption prices to the quantities of self-farmed food
and food gifts. Food consumption is reported with a 7-day recall and is subject to seasonality
(Paxson, 1993). We use the fact that the surveys are rolled out across the year (e.g., from March
to March in Malawi 2004/05 and 2010/11) to construct seasonally-adjusted annual measures
of food expenditure (see Appendix A).8 Further, we use a new and simple price-unit conversion
method to transform the reported amounts of self-farmed consumption and food gifts into a same
baseline unit, kilograms (see Appendix B). This is useful to construct measures of caloric intake
that we also use in our analysis.
Other nondurable expenditure classified under clothing (3%), health (i.e., prevention, treat-
ment, hospitalization, and traditional healers—2%), education (2%), utilities (15%), housing
(i.e, mostly self-reported rental value of dwelling or rent—2%), transportation (1%) and other
nondurables (13%)9. Nondurable expenditure items (other than food) are collected monthly,
quarterly, or annually. Analogously to food, we deseasonalize and annualize each of these non-
durable items. This level of detail is similar in the Tanzania and Uganda ISA surveys.
2.2 Household Income
The main resource in rural areas is agricultural production. Production is reported by crops per
plot and by season (rainy season, dry season, and permanent crop). We construct an annual
measure of the entire agricultural production, sold and unsold, in monetary terms, which is
Another notable exception is the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (Krueger and Perri, 2011).
8The Tanzania survey is also rolled out in 12 months. In Uganda the surveys are not rolled out throughout
the year, but across all waves there are data for all months and we are able to deseasonalize the data.
9For example: fuel, newspaper and paper products, milling fees, hygiene and cleaning products, cooking and
cleaning utensils, repair costs, cell phones, carpets and rugs, mats and linen, mosquito nets, rubber, plastics,
construction and repair materials, mortgage payments, marriage and funeral costs and bridewealth costs.
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household agricultural income. We use consumption prices to assign a monetary value to unsold
agricultural production; alternatively, using the price-at-the-gate underestimates the value of
unsold production (see Appendix C). In our computations, we use net measures of income and
subtract the full set of production costs from intermediate inputs (seeds and fertilizers), rental cost
of plots, rental costs of capital equipment and structures, hired labor, and transportation costs
associated with inputs purchases and production sales.10 Note that in net agricultural income
we include the contribution of household labor to agricultural production.11 Livestock sales and
animal produce are also reported for the past 12 months, and we include this in agricultural income
after netting out their associated costs (e.g., animal feed, vaccinations, veterinary services, and
hired labor).
Other sources of household income include labor, businesses, capital and net transfers. Labor
income is reported by occupation including main, secondary, and informal (e.g., ganyu). The
survey has specific question on remuneration and number of hours worked per occupation that
we use to compute annual labor income. In terms of business income, for each enterprise we
compute net business income as total annual sales minus costs. Capital income includes net
interest income, pension income, rental of property and durables, asset sales, inheritance etc.
Despite the level of detail, household capital income is negligible compared with other sources of
income. Finally, net transfers are defined as income transfers/gifts received from rural areas/urban
areas/other countries minus income transfers/gifts given in the past 12 months. We also include
food gifts from the consumption questionnaire (deseasonalized and annualized) in our definition of
disposable income. In Malawi, food gifts represent approximately 6% of total disposable income
and dwarfs the 1% contribution of net (cash) transfers in Malawi.
Underreporting of Income The underreporting of income is a recurrent issue in household
surveys in both rich and poor countries (Deaton, 1997; Piketty, 2014). Tax avoidance is one
reason for underreporting. This does not seem a major issue in the SSA countries that we study.
For instance, we find it is reassuring that among rural households that can categorize as autarkic
(i.e, with no production sales) the reported agricultural production (agricultural module) and the
reported annualized self-farmed consumption (consumption module) yield very similar quantities
(see Appendix C). Moreover, in Malawi less than 10% of the population is actually eligible to pay
income tax,12 a similar figure to that of the US in the 1930s (Piketty, 2014). What is perhaps
10In Malawi, the majority of households receive seed and fertilizer subsidies by the Farm Inputs Subsidy Program.
We use the subsidized (coupon) prices reported by each household.
11This is innocuous for our purposes of measuring household income because the labor income generated by
household members in agricultural production is also part of household income. Under some assumptions, this
labor income can be separated from net profits, but this is beyond the scope of our paper.
12See the Malawi Revenue Authority: http://www.mra.mw/.
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more relevant for our analysis is that the effect of the underreporting bias is well understood (e.g.,
Banerjee and Piketty (2005) for India, Alvaredo and London˜o (2013) for Colombia, and Heathcote
et al. (2010) and Meyer et al. (2015) for the US). Any correction of the bias would simply increase
the income of households at the top of the distribution. For example, Alvaredo and Gasparini
(2013) compare the share of income accrued to the top 1% according to household-survey data
and the tax records from actual register data. The share from tax records is higher than the
share from household-survey data by a factor of 1.52 in Argentina, 1.74 in Uruguay, and 1.47 in
Colombia.13 In Malawi the top 1% earns 20% of total income, a share that increases to 31% if
we apply the average correction estimated in Alvaredo and London˜o (2013) to Malawi. That is,
corrections of underreporting imply a higher income inequality. This reinforces our argument in
Section 3 for a low transmission from income inequality to consumption and wealth inequality.
2.3 Wealth and Its Portfolio
Our measure of household wealth is net worth which includes land, housing, livestock, agricultural
equipment and structures (e.g., tools and barns), fishing equipment, other durables (e.g, cars,
furniture, and household electrical appliances), minus debt. The underreporting of wealth is also
potentially important, but perhaps less of a concern than the underreporting of income for three
reasons. First, there are no taxes on assets or property in Malawi. Second, note that the two
main assets held by these households are directly observable: (i) the dwelling is immediately seen
by the surveyor and; (ii) the land holdings are measured by GPS. Third, one of the methodological
improvements of the LSMS-ISA is the internal consistency checks (Carletto et al., 2010) that
help further decrease measurement error in assets (e.g., GPS mapping, ability to sketch map
of the plots, digital photography).14 Three additional remarks are in order. First, the value of
each asset refers to the self-reported current selling price, which adjusts for asset quality and is
preferred to the standard use of the purchasing price (subject to recall bias) plus ad-hoc estimates
of depreciation. Second, the value of savings (or other forms of liquid) is not collected but other
studies suggest it is negligible (Beck et al., 2008; Brune et al., 2015). Third, loans only cover
the last 12 months, but we note that long-term household debt such as mortgages and student
loans which account for 90% of household debt in the US, are almost nonexistent in Malawi.
Finally, we note that the survey for Uganda does not report the value of outstanding debt,
whereas Malawi and Tanzania do so. While debt is a minor component of net worth in Malawi
and Tanzania, Uganda’s wealth measure is likely to be overestimated for this reason. Also, the
13Precisely, the household survey and tax records shares of income accruing to the top 1% are respectively 8.8%
to 13.4% in Argentina, 8.2% to 14.3% in Uruguay, and 13.9% ti 20.4% in Colombia.
14Carletto et al. (2013) show that the Gini indexes for self-estimated land size and for GPS-measured land size
are extraordinarily similar: respectively 0.399 and 0.395 for Malawi.
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Table 1: World Development Indicators and LSMS-ISA (Current USD, 2010)
(a) Macro Data: World Development Indicators, 2010
Malawi Tanzania Uganda Thailand Mexico US
Income per capita 359 524 471 4,802 8,920 48,377
Agricultural share (% Income) 29 28 25 12 3 1
Consumption per capita 257 328 376 2,577 6,023 32,783
Rural population (%) 84 71 85 56 22 19
Life expectancy 53 59 57 73 77 79
(b) Micro Data: LSMS-ISA, 2010
Malawi Tanzania Uganda
Income per household 1,398 1,610 1,618
[1,323; 1,472] [1,470; 1,750] [1,197; 2,040]
Income per capita 306 303 296
[289; 322] [278; 330] [218; 375]
Agricultural share (% Income) 43 34 23
Consumption per household 1,566 1,920 2,350
[1,532; 1600] [1,854; 1,987] [2,198; 2,503]
Consumption per capita 343 364 430
[335; 350] [351; 376] [401; 459]
Rural households (%) 82 69 77
Sample size 12,015 3,014 2,337
Notes: Statistics in panel (a) are provided by the World Development Indicators at the World Bank and are based
on national accounts data - Gross National Income in current dollars (data retrieved in 2010). Statistics in panel
(b) are produced from the ISA household surveys data provided by the World Bank and adjusted as described in
Section 2. Brackets denote 95% confidence intervals.
survey for Tanzania does not report the value of housing and other durables; thus, the monetary
value of wealth reported for Tanzania is clearly underestimated, particularly for urban areas.
2.4 Household Survey Data vs. National Accounts
It is important to compare household survey data versus national accounts as they potentially
yield different estimates of consumption and income level and growth (Krueger et al., 2010).
Table 1 compares our household survey data from ISAs with the national accounts data for 2010
from the World Development Indicators at the World Bank database. The national accounts
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figures are reported in panel (a), and the mean income and consumption per capita computed
with the ISA household survey data adjusted as described in this Section are reported in panel
(b). Focusing on Malawi, we find that the mean income per capita from our household survey
data is US$306, which is lower than the measure reported in the national accounts number of
US$359.15 Income per capita from national accounts is also larger than that from the ISA data
in Tanzania and Uganda.
Focusing on Malawi, note that the composition of income as estimated by the household
survey implies that agricultural output represents 43% of total income, while this figure is solely
29% in the national accounts. This implies that national accounts and household survey data
show similar levels of agricultural income. Further, if the national accounts are doing a good job
in measuring nonagricultural income, the household survey is potentially underestimating (or not
observing) some component of nonagricultural income. For example, we already discussed that
there may be some underreporting in business income and that the share of income accrued to
the top 1% is on average higher by a factor of 1.5 if measured with tax receipts (Alvaredo and
Gasparini, 2013); also, illegal income from the diversion of international aid (e.g., in the form of
bribes) could potentially account for some of this discrepancy (Deaton, 2005).16
The observation that income is lower than consumption from household survey data is likely
due to the underreporting of income, which is common in household survey data. The idea is
that consumption is in general better measured than income (Grosh and Deaton, 2000). In large
part, this is due to the fact that the consumption basket in poor countries consists mostly of
food which is usually collected with 7-days recall. In contrast, income faces larger recall bias,
in particular, if there is only one (or few) rainy seasons in a country. Indeed, the incorporation
of a new and comprehensive agricultural questionnaire (i.e, ISA) to previous LSMS data aims
at improving the collection of agricultural production (i.e., the main source of income in these
countries) to reduce underreporting. We do not observe this issue in national accounts because
consumption is largely computed as a residual.
The main disparity between the household survey and the national accounts estimates is
15We use the nominal exchange rate for 1US$ in March 2010: Malawi, 152. We transform nominal variables
into real using official CPI measures from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Malawi that differ across food
and non-food items and across rural and urban areas. Spatial differences in prices might introduce additional
biases in the comparison of expenditure across households within rural and urban areas, although this is more
of a concern for larger countries (Deaton and Dupriez, 2011). We proceed similarly for the other countries with
nominal exchange rates for 1US$ in March 2010 of 1,350 for and 2,110 for Uganda.
16The reason is that international aid shows up in national accounts but not necessarily in household sur-
vey data. See, for example, the cashgate scandal covered by The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2014/nov/11/malawi-official-jailed-cashgate-scandal-aid. This way, it
is likely that the household survey will capture some, but not all, of the international aid, which according to WDI
represents 26% of the total income in Malawi in 2010.
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Table 2: Rural and Urban Levels: Cross-Country Comparison (ISA 2010)
Malawi Tanzania Uganda
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Consumption 1,318 2,951 1,547 2,875 1,796 4,904
” (p.c.) 287 662 280 623 319 1,048
. Nondurables 1,223 2,684 1,468 2,599 1,245 3,207
. Durables 40 143 4 76 328 1,060
Income 1,142 2,795 1,227 2,587 1,262 3,221
” (p.c.) 249 626 220 560 225 681
. Agriculture 662 245 690 204 426 132
. Labor 212 1,630 248 1,390 183 846
. Business 128 1,052 178 800 534 1,843
Wealth 1,309 3,976 3,361 1,757 6,148 10,256
. Assets
Land 575 401 2,341 1,585 4,421 4,774
House 404 2,690 n.a. n.a. 1,190 4,336
Land (acres) 1.7 0.4 6.0 2.5 4.7 1.5
. Debt 5 37 11 22 n.a. n.a.
Sample size 9,820 2,195 2,067 945 1,809 528
Notes: All variables except land acres are in current USD. The construction of the measures of household
consumption, income, and wealth is discussed in Section 2, with further details in the Online Appendix. Per
capita variables are computed dividing by total household size.
found in consumption. The ISA estimates of consumption per capita are higher than the national
accounts estimates for all three countries. This is consistent with other Sub-Saharan Africa
countries (Deaton, 2005). For example, the national accounts are likely to underestimate the
value of consumption from own agricultural production, which we estimate to be 20% of total
consumption from the household survey data in Malawi. This suggests that national accounts
might not only be underestimating consumption growth, as suggested in Young (2012), but also
the level.17 However, the ranking of consumption per capita across countries is maintained in the
macro and the micro data: Malawi is the poorest, followed by Tanzania, then Uganda.
2.5 Rural-Urban Differences in Levels
The rural-urban gap in consumption and income within countries is at least an order of magnitude
larger than the country differences across Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. In urban Malawi, mean
per capita consumption and income is, respectively, US$648 and US$618, while these figures are
17However, note that our measure of consumption is different from that in Young (2012), who uses the ownership
durables (and other education and health measures) to proxy for real consumption.
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US$297 and US$245 in rural areas (Table 2). That is, consumption per capita in urban areas is
2.18 times higher than in rural areas, and income per capita in urban areas is 2.51 times higher
than in rural areas. The magnitude of the difference between rural and urban areas is even higher
for Tanzania and Uganda. Across rural areas in different countries, differences in consumption
and income levels are no higher than 15%.
In terms of composition, and focusing on Malawi, we find that consumption in both rural and
urban areas is dominated by nondurables that represent more than 95% of the total consumption
basket. In terms of income, the major components in rural areas are agriculture income and
labor income that respectively represent 60% and 19% of household income. In urban areas
labor income represents 53% household income, while agriculture barely 10%. Business income
represents 10% of household income in rural areas and 34% in urban areas. These proportions
are similar for Tanzania and Uganda.
Finally, in terms of wealth, urban households hold 3.03 times more wealth than rural house-
holds in Malawi. In rural areas the main component is land, which represents 44% of household
wealth, housing 30%, and livestock 13%. In urban areas the main component is housing, which
represents 59% of household wealth, other durables 27%, and land 14%.
3 An Empirical Analysis of Consumption, Income, and Wealth Inequal-
ity in Rural and Urban Sub-Saharan Africa
Whether distributional differences in consumption, income, and wealth exist across rural and
urban areas is a lesser-understood phenomenon. That is the focus of our study. For the sake of
brevity, we focus on Malawi in the main text and relegate most of the results for Tanzania and
Uganda to the Online Appendix. Malawi has the largest and arguably the highest quality data.18
3.1 Consumption, Income, and Wealth Inequality
In SSA, wealth inequality is larger than income inequality and, income inequality is larger than
consumption inequality. In Malawi these numbers are (in variance of logs): 1.95 for wealth, 1.09
for income and 0.49 for consumption. This ordering also holds within urban and rural areas and
for other measures of inequality (Table 3). Furthermore, we find that for consumption, income,
and wealth, inequality is higher in urban areas than in rural areas. This can also be observed
in Figure 1; the densities for wealth are flatter than those for income, and the densities for
18Malawi has a sample size that is roughly three times larger than Uganda and Tanzania, and has more detailed
and comprehensive information for the triplet CIW as discussed in Section 2.
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Inequality: Rural and Urban Malawi (ISA 2010)
(a) Variance of Logs
Malawi U.S.
Rural Urban Full SCF PSID CEX
Consumption 0.41 0.55 0.50 – 0.79 0.35
Income 0.98 1.56 1.09 0.99 0.97 0.55
Wealth 1.49 4.52 1.96 4.53 2.11 –
Inequality Ratios:
. C/I 0.42 0.35 0.46 – 0.81 0.64
. W/I 1.52 2.90 1.80 4.58 2.18 –
(b) Gini
Malawi U.S.
Rural Urban Full SCF PSID CEX
Consumption 0.36 0.42 0.41 – 0.41 0.32
Income 0.53 0.70 0.60 0.58 0.44 0.38
Wealth 0.60 0.84 0.70 0.82 0.79 –
Inequality Ratios:
. C/I 0.68 0.60 0.68 – 0.93 0.84
. W/I 1.07 1.20 1.17 1.41 1.80 –
Notes: All variables are in current USD. For Malawi, all computations are done by the authors. The inequality
ratios divide a measure of inequality for the variable in the numerator by the same inequality measure for the
variable in the denominator. The measures of inequality that we study are the variance of logged variables (panel
(a)) and the Gini index (panel (b)). For the US, we compare three data sources. First, we simply borrow the 2007
SCF estimates from D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011); second, we compute the 2006 PSID statistics using data kindly
provided by Krueger et al. (2017); and, third, we compute the CEX statistics using the data publicly available
from Krueger et al. (2010). Note that the CEX consumption and income data are top coded, which helps explain
its lower dispersion. The construction of the measures of household consumption, income, and wealth is discussed
in Section 2, with further details in the Online Appendix.
consumption are more concentrated that those of income in both rural and urban areas.19
In rural areas wealth and income inequality is respectively 1.48 and 0.98 (in variance of logs)
and 4.51 and 1.56 in urban areas (panel (a) Table 3). Thus, the ratio of wealth-to-income
19The distributions of CIW are not symmetric with skewness statistics different from zero. The asymmetry
is larger for wealth than for income, and for income than for consumption. All distributions are skewed to the
right, and more skewed in rural areas than in urban areas. In rural areas, the skewness values are 3.9, 18.6
and 19.9 for consumption, income, and wealth respectively. In urban areas, the skewness values are 2.9, 7.9,
9.1 for consumption, income, and wealth respectively. The CIW distributions also have heavier tails than the
normal distribution as shown by the high kurtosis values in rural areas (34.4, 580.3 and 662.4. for consumption,
income, and wealth respectively) and in urban areas (13.9, 86.9 and 95.1 for consumption, income, and wealth
respectively). In logs, the distributions resembles the normal distribution (i.e., skewness zero and kurtosis three).
In rural areas CIW have respective skewness values of 0.23, -0.18, -0.67 and kurtosis values of 3.2, 4.9, and 5.9.
In urban areas CIW have respective skewness values of 0.22, 0.27, -0.31 and kurtosis values of 3.5, 4.4, and 3.4.
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inequality is 1.51 in rural areas and 3.05 in urban areas which suggests that, for a given amount
of income dispersion, there is a larger ability to generate wealth dispersion in urban areas than in
rural areas. Comparing SSA with US inequality, we find that income dispersion transmits much
less into wealth dispersion in SSA than in the US. Precisely, in terms of household income, the US
has a log variance of 0.99 for the year 2010, as reported in D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011) using the
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the variance of logs in income in SSA
is roughly the same, 1.09 in Malawi. In contrast, in terms of wealth the US has a log variance of
4.53, which is more than twice larger than that of Malawi, 1.95.20 That is, given similar income
inequality, the US is able to generate 2.3 times more wealth dispersion than SSA.21
This lower transmission from income to wealth inequality in SSA compared with the US is
present in both rural and urban SSA. Rural Malawi has income inequality similar to that of the
US, with a variance of logs of 0.99, while wealth inequality in rural Malawi is 1.49, i.e., one-third
of the US wealth inequality. That is, with roughly the same income dispersion as rural Malawi,
the United States is able to generate three times the wealth dispersion of rural Malawi. Also,
the US is able to generate the same amount of wealth dispersion as urban SSA with about 60%
of its income dispersion. This is perhaps the first indication of a larger inability to accumulate
wealth in rural SSA compared with urban SSA, and in the SSA compared with the US. Similar
insights arise if we look at Gini indexes (panel (b) Table 3).
Focusing on consumption, inequality in rural areas is smaller than in urban areas with variance
of logs of respectively 0.40 and 0.57 (panel (a) Table 3). That is, consumption is more unequal
in urban areas than in rural areas by roughly a factor of 1.4 for Malawi. Urban and rural areas
share a similar ratio of consumption-to-income inequality; a ratio that has been used as a first
pass to understand consumption insurance (Krueger and Perri, 2006; Morten, 2013). However,
Aguiar and Bils (2011) argue that there is a higher underlying consumption inequality than that
inferred from consumption surveys with long recall due to a loss of quality data from goods that
are mostly purchased by rich people.22 In the SSA countries that we study this is more likely to
occur in urban areas than rural areas, as non-food consumption (with a longer recall period than
food) is more predominant for rich households in urban areas. Thus, any corrected measure of
consumption would likely break the apparent tie in the ratio of consumption-to-income inequality
between rural and urban areas. This tie breaking would be in the direction of a larger transmission
from income to consumption in urban areas then in rural areas. Regardless of any correction, there
20The figures for Tanzania and Uganda are similar, see the Online Appendix B.
21Using PSID data the variance of log wealth is of 2.11 for the US, also larger than its counterpart in Malawi.
The lower variance in the PSID data compared with the SCF data is explained by the inability of the PSID to
recover the top of the wealth distribution which SCF does oversampling rich households (Krueger et al., 2017).
22Attanasio et al. (2007) argue that these differences in CEX data arise from interview data (monthly recalls)
versus diary data (7-day recalls).
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Figure 1: Density of Consumption, Income, and Wealth in Rural and Urban Malawi (ISA 2010)
(a) Consumption (b) Income
(c) Wealth
Notes: The construction of household consumption, income, and wealth is described in Section 2. All variables
have been logged.
is an already clear distinction between the ratio of consumption-to-income inequality between SSA
and the US which is, respectively 0.43 and 0.81. That is, the consumption-to-income inequality
ratio is much larger in the US than in Malawi.23 This represents our first evidence suggesting
lower transmission from income to consumption (i.e., higher consumption insurance) in poor SSA
than in the US. Similar results are obtained with Gini indexes (panel (b) Table 3).
A recurrent theme in the inequality literature is the bias from the underreporting of income,
in particular, from rich households (see Section 2.2). However, the correction of such bias simply
23This ratio for the US is 0.64 if we use CEX data in our computations. That is, CEX also implies a larger
transmission from income to consumption in the US than in Malawi. An important difference between CEX and
PSID data is that CEX data are top coded which can help explain why CEX tends to provide lower inequality
measures (0.35 and 0.55 for the log variance of consumption and income respectively) than PSID data (0.79 and
0.97 for the log variance of consumption and income respectively).
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implies an increase in income inequality (Banerjee and Piketty, 2005; Alvaredo and London˜o,
2013; Heathcote et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2015), which would strengthen our results by making
income even more unequal than consumption and wealth in SSA.
The use of cross-sectional data (e.g., Malawi, ISA 2010) to describe inequality patterns helps
preserve a consistent comparison with previous studies in developed countries (D´ıaz-Gime´nez
et al., 2011; Krueger et al., 2017), but it comes with caveats. In particular, it might be that part
of the dispersion that we report with cross-sectional data is not all genuine variation (see our
discussions on underreporting in Section 2.2 and on recall bias in the Appendix D). Note that
these measurement issues are also acknowledged and relevant in the context of rich countries as
well (Heathcote et al., 2010; Aguiar and Bils, 2011; Meyer et al., 2015). In order to explore this
question in the context of SSA, we treat household averages across our panel as cross-sectional
data. That is, we use the available panel data for Malawi (the 2010/11 wave and the 2013
wave) to compute household-specific averages of consumption, income, and wealth across waves
and, then, we re-compute Table 3 with these measures. This implies measures of consumption,
income, and wealth that are more permanent in nature. Our insights do not change with this
panel-based analysis (see the Online Appendix B). Under these new panel-based variables it is
still the case that income inequality is larger than consumption inequality and lower than wealth
inequality within rural and urban areas. It is also the case that urban inequality is significantly
larger than rural inequality by a similar factor. Similar insights arise for Uganda and Tanzania.
3.2 The Joint Cross-Sectional Behavior of Consumption, Income, and Wealth
A more direct measure of the transmission from income to wealth can be extracted from the joint
densities. The correlation between income and wealth is lower in rural areas, 0.17, than in urban
areas, 0.34 (panel (a) and (b), Table 4).This implies a stronger transmission from income to
wealth in urban areas than in rural areas which is suggestive of a larger inability to accumulate in
rural areas. In rural areas the correlation is stable throughout the income distribution, whereas in
urban areas we find a slightly opened L-shaped joint density (Figure 2). For the bottom 80% of
the income distribution the correlation between income and wealth is 0.06, while this correlation
is 0.30 for the top 20% of income earners. Thus, only the income-rich households in urban areas
seem able to accumulate wealth. For the whole sample there is a weaker link between income
and wealth in SSA, where the correlation of these two variables is 0.29, than in the U.S., where
this correlation is almost twice larger, 0.57 (panel (c) and (d), Table 4).24
The correlation of consumption and income is also lower in rural areas, 0.37, than in urban
24The correlation between income and wealth is even smaller in Tanzania and Uganda, respectively 0.06 and
0.20. Note that the ISA wealth data for Tanzania and Uganda is not as good as that for Malawi, Section 2.3.
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Consumption, Income, and Wealth (ISA 2010)
(a) Rural Malawi
C I W
Consumption (C) 1.00 – –
Income (I) 0.37 1.00 –
Wealth (W) 0.30 0.17 1.00
(b) Urban Malawi
C I W
Consumption (C) 1.00 – –
Income (I) 0.60 1.00 –
Wealth (W) 0.44 0.40 1.00
(c) Malawi
C I W
Consumption (C) 1.00 – –
Income (I) 0.49 1.00 –
Wealth (W) 0.39 0.31 1.00
(d) United States
C I W
Consumption (C) 1.00 – –
Income (I) 0.68 1.00 –
Wealth (W) 0.20 0.57 1.00
Notes: All variables are in current USD. For Malawi, all computations are done by the authors. For the US,
the correlation between income and wealth is directly borrowed from (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011) that use 2007
SCF data; we use CEX data publicly available from Krueger et al. (2010) to compute the correlation between
consumption and income; and the correlation between consumption and wealth is directly borrowed from (Krueger
et al., 2017) using 2006 PSID data. The construction of the measures of household consumption, income, and
wealth is discussed in Section 2, with further details in the Online Appendix.
areas, 0.62 (Table 4). This suggests a lower transmission from income to consumption, i.e., more
consumption insurance, in rural areas than in urban areas in SSA. This correlation is fairly stable
across the income distribution (Figure 2). Finally, notice that this correlation is smaller in SSA
than in the US, respectively, 0.53 and 0.68 (Table 4). These results suggest a larger ability to
insure consumption in rural SSA then in urban SSA, and in SSA than in the US.
Finally, note that in both rich and poor countries if we summarize the transmission from
wealth to consumption with their correlation, this transmission is lower than from income to
consumption (panel (c) and (d) Table 4). While merely indicative, a stronger relation between
income and consumption than between wealth and consumption suggest that shocks to wealth
have potentially a lesser effect on consumption than income shocks. This is also the case for
rural and urban areas in Malawi where the correlation between wealth and consumption is 0.31
and 0.43, respectively (panel (a) and (b) Table 4). That is, this correlation is lower in rural areas
than in urban areas pointing to a large ability to insure consumption in rural areas independently
of the type of shock (income or wealth) compared with urban areas.25
25Our results remain unchanged using panel data for Malawi (the 2010/11 wave and the 2013 wave) to construct
household-specific averages of consumption, income, and wealth across waves, see the Online Appendix.
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Figure 2: Joint Densities of Consumption, Income, and Wealth in Rural and Urban Malawi (ISA 2010)
(a) Income and Wealth, Rural
(b) Income and Consumption, Rural
(c) Income and Wealth, Urban
(d) Income and Consumption, Urban
Notes: The construction of household consumption, income, and wealth is described in Section 2. All variables have been logged.
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3.3 Consumption, Income, and Wealth Over the Life Cycle
To gain a better understanding of accumulation we describe lifecycle behavior of income and
wealth. We plot the life cycle profiles of income normalized to 1 at age 25 (panel (a), Figure 3),
where the age is that of the household head..26 The age profile of income in Malawi shows a
hump in both rural and urban areas that peaks around age 45. The hump is less salient in rural
areas. In rural areas income is about 1.5 times larger at its peak than at age 25, while in urban
areas income is about twice as large at its peak than at age 25. This implies a nationwide income
age profile for Malawi that is roughly 1.75 times larger at its peak than at age 25. With non
top-coded income data from the SCF, D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011) find that income in the US
grows over the lifecycle by a factor of 4. This implies that household income grows roughly four
times less over the lifecycle in SSA than in the US. This way, flatter nationwide life cycle profiles
of income in SSA countries may be the result of a composition effect driven by the larger share
of rural households in SSA than in rich countries.27
The differentials in the accumulation of wealth over the lifecycle are more sizable than the
differentials of income. In the rural areas of SSA, as it is the case of income, wealth accumulates
less over the lifecycle than urban areas (panel (b), Figure 3). Rural wealth peaks at the age
of 50 with a value that is less than 1.5 times the rural wealth at age 25. This implies that
wealth accumulates roughly at the same pace as income grows in rural areas, which is consistent
with a relatively constant lifecycle wealth-to-income ratio in rural areas(panel (c), Figure 3). In
contrast, in urban areas wealth rises more rapidly than income, which suggests a higher ability
to accumulate wealth conditional on income. In urban areas, wealth shows a peak at age 60
that is roughly 6 times higher than the urban wealth at age 25. This implies that the urban
wealth-to-income ratio grows by roughly four times from a ratio of 0.5 at age 25 to a ratio of 2
at age 65. Nationwide, the wealth-to-income ratio in Malawi grows from 1 at age 25 to 1.5 at
age 65, which implies a lifetime growth of roughly 50%. In the US, the wealth-to-income ratio
grows from 2 at age 25 to 10 at age 65—a lifetime growth of 400%. This suggests that the
ability to accumulate wealth (relative to income) is eight times larger in the US than in Malawi,
and two times larger in the US than in urban Malawi.
26To preserve the comparison with the non-top coded cross-sectional lifecycle profiles of income and wealth in
D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011), we focus on reporting the estimated age profiles using the ISA 2004/05 and 2010/11
cross-sectional data. In our estimation we controlling for time effects only. Although not reported here, our results
stand robust to controlling for cohorts effects only.
27Our results for income relate to those in Bils and Klenow (2000) and Lagakos et al. (2016) that document
flatter age profiles for wages in poor countries than in rich countries. Note that we focus on household total income
to take into account that in the SSA countries that we investigate there is a large rural population (approximately
80%) for whom own agricultural production (rather than wages) is the main source of income.
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Figure 3: Lifecycle Household Income and Wealth in Rural and Urban Malawi (ISA 2010)
(a) Income (b) Wealth
(c) Wealth-to-Income Ratio (d) Land Size (GPS Measured) and Value
(e) Land, Housing and Livestock (f) Land, Housing and Livestock (% Rural Wealth)
Notes: The construction of household income and wealth (and its subitems) is described in Section 2. The age
of the household is the age of the household head. All variables have been normalized to 1 at age 25, except for
the wealth-to-income ratio in panel (c) and the share of rural wealth in panel (f). Panel (d), panel (e), and panel
(f) refer to the rural areas only. We discuss these results in Section 3.3. In all graphs we show the estimated age
dummies of the variable of interest after controlling for time dummies. The data are the ISA 2004/05 and the
2010/11 cross-sections 20
The inability to accumulate assets over the lifecycle is particularly strong in rural areas of SSA.
This is consistent with most of rural wealth being land holdings together with land barely growing
over the lifecycle (a factor of 1.5). This is true whether we use land value or GPS-measured land
size (panel (d), Figure 3). The low accumulation of land over the lifecycle is perhaps not surprising
given the low amount of available marketed land (Restuccia and Santaeula`lia-Llopis, 2017). The
component of wealth that shows the strongest accumulation is livestock, which is a reminiscent of
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) for India. In Malawi, livestock grows by a factor of three over the
lifecycle (panel (e), Figure 3). However, despite this accumulation, livestock remains below 20%
of total household wealth at age 65 while this proportion is 40% for land (panel (f), Figure 3).
Lastly, it is important to note that this large inability to grow wealth over the lifecycle coexists
with a large ability to smooth consumption over the lifecycle. First, lifecycle consumption is flatter
in rural areas than in urban areas of SSA, suggesting a higher ability to smooth consumption in
the rural areas of SSA than in the urban areas. Although not reported here, this is true for both
total expenditure and food consumption measured in caloric intake (De Magalha˜es et al., 2017).28
Second, compared with the US, consumption profiles are smoother in SSA than in the US. These
results also stand after controlling for household structure a` la Deaton and Paxson (1994). The
smoother lifecycle consumption profiles in SSA than the in US convey the presence of powerful
mechanisms that help better insure consumption over the lifecycle in rural Malawi compared to
urban Malawi, and better in SSA compared to the US. Again, this result adds evidence to a
relatively large ability to preserve consumption over the lifecycle in poor countries, in particular
rural areas of poor countries, with respect to the US.
3.4 The Top and Bottom of the Consumption, Income, and Wealth Distributions
There is a growing interest in the behavior of the top (and bottom) of the distributions of income
and wealth in particular (Piketty, 2014). For the case of poor countries, such as those in SSA, it is
also interesting to study consumption given the importance of informal redistribution mechanisms
that determine welfare (Kinnan, 2014). Recent macroeconomic studies on welfare in developed
countries also incorporate consumption (of wealth-poor households) to the discussion of inequality
(Krueger et al., 2017).29
28In De Magalha˜es et al. (2017) we investigate these lifecycle patterns of consumption in more detail, and
associate this ability to smooth consumption to an increase in self-farm production in old age which comes at the
cost of less children schooling and lower nutrient quality for households with elderly heads.
29It is relevant to note that the studies of income and wealth inequality typically use non-top coded data from
the SCF (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011) (that excludes the FORBES 400) or administrative data Piketty (2014).
While our data is not top-coded, the LSMS-ISA sampling strategy does not oversample the rich households and
might be missing the very rich of the income distribution. In this context, it is important to note that a resolution
to this potential caveat (e.g., a` la Alvaredo and Gasparini (2013)) would simply increase income inequality in the
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The marginal distributions are consistent with the measures of inequality reported earlier.
Urban areas are more unequal than rural areas, and there is less inequality in consumption than
in income, and less inequality in income than in wealth (Table 5). Ranking households by con-
sumption, the top 10% of the distribution consumes 22% of the total consumption in rural areas
(panel (a1), Table 5) and 36% in urban areas (panel (b1), Table 5). The top 1% consumes 7%
and 9% in rural and urban areas, respectively. In terms of income, the top 10% of the income
distribution earns 43% and 62% of the total income in rural and urban areas, respectively. The
top 1% of the income distribution earns 14% and 25% of total income in rural and urban areas,
respectively. In terms of wealth, we find that the top 10% of the wealth distribution holds 49%
of total wealth in rural Malawi and 73% in urban areas. Further, the top 1% of the wealth
distribution holds 17% and 32% of total wealth in rural and urban areas, respectively.
Nationwide, the marginal distribution of income in Malawi (panel (c1), Table 5) is strikingly
similar to that of the US (panel (d1), Table 5). In Malawi, the top 20% of the income distribution
earn 62% of total income, while this is 61% in the US. The top 10% and 1% of the income
distribution earn respectively 50% and 20% of total income in Malawi and 47% and 21% in the
US (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011). Despite similar inequality in income between Malawi and the
US, wealth dispersion is higher in the US. The top 10% and top 1% of the wealth distribution
in the US hold, respectively, 71% and 34% of total wealth (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011). These
shares are lower for Malawi, respectively, 58% and 25%. This wealth differential is larger when
we look at the rural areas of Malawi where 85% of the population lives and where the top 10%
and top 1% of the wealth distribution hold, respectively, 40% and 17% of total rural wealth, i.e.,
almost half of its US counterparts. This suggests a much lower transmission from income to
wealth in Malawi than in the US.
An additional measure of the transmission of income inequality to wealth inequality is the
ratio between the share of total income held by the top 10% of the income distribution and the
share of total wealth held by the top 10% of the wealth distribution. This ratio is not ideal as
it has the caveat of not necessarily using the same set of households—an issue that we resolve
below by studying the conditional distributions for Malawi and the US—but has the advantage
that we can compute it for a larger set of countries for which only marginal distributions are
available from Piketty (2014). We show the top 1% and top 10% of the income and wealth
distributions for our SSA countries and a set of rich countries in Table 6.30
SSA countries that we study and hence reinforce our results of a lower transmission from income to consumption
and wealth in SSA (see Section 2.2).
30Piketty (2014) also provides top income shares for a set of emerging countries, but top wealth shares are not
available for those countries which implies that we cannot compute these ratios for these countries.
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Table 5: Shares of Total Consumption, Income, and Wealth by Rural and Urban Residency, Malawi (ISA 2010)
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
(a) Rural Malawi
(a1) Marginal Distributions: Shares of Total (%)
Consumption 0 1 2 7 11 16 23 43 10 14 6 100
Income -0 0 1 3 8 12 20 57 11 18 15 100
Wealth -0 0 0 2 6 11 18 63 11 21 17 100
(a2) Income Partition: Shares of Total (%)
Consumption 1 2 3 12 15 19 22 32 7 10 3 100
Wealth 0 2 2 10 12 15 21 41 10 14 4 100
(c) Malawi
(c1) Marginal Distributions: Shares of Total (%)
Consumption 0 1 1 6 10 15 22 47 10 16 8 100
Income -0 0 1 3 7 11 18 61 10 20 18 100
Wealth -0 0 0 2 5 9 15 70 11 22 25 100
(c2) Income Partition: Shares of Total (%)
Consumption 1 2 3 12 14 17 21 36 8 12 5 100
Wealth 1 1 2 9 11 14 18 48 9 15 12 100
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
(b) Urban Malawi
(b1) Marg. Dist.: Shares of Total (%)
0 1 1 6 10 15 21 48 11 17 6 100
0 0 0 2 5 9 15 69 12 26 19 100
-0 0 0 0 1 4 10 85 12 26 35 100
(b2) Inc. Part.: Shares of Total (%)
1 3 3 13 13 16 19 40 9 14 4 100
1 1 1 5 11 9 12 62 10 29 13 100
(d) U.S.
(d1) Marg. Dist.: Shares of Total (%)
0 1 1 5 11 16 23 45 11 12 6 100
-0 0 1 3 5 11 18 61 10 16 21 100
-0 -0 -0 -0 1 5 11 84 11 27 33 100
(d2) Inc. Part.: Shares of Total (%)
0 1 2 8 13 17 24 38 9 9 4 100
1 1 0 4 5 8 14 70 11 23 26 100
Notes: All variables are averages in current USD. The construction of the measures of household consumption, income, and wealth is discussed in Section 2,
with further details in the Online Appendix. The numbers for the US are results directly borrowed from D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al. (2011) who use the 2007 SCF
for the study of income and wealth, and whenever consumption is involved (its marginal distribution and its joint distribution with income) we show our
results from the 2006 PSID data kindly provided by Krueger et al. (2017).
23
Table 6: Cross-Country Comparison: Top of the Income and Wealth Distributions (2010)
Micro Data Macro Data
Income Wealth W-to-I Shares Ratio Inc. (USD)
Countries Top 1% Top 10% Top 1% Top 10% Top 1% Top 10% WDI
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Malawi 18 46 25 56 1.4 1.2 359
Tanzania 14 49 24 70 1.7 1.4 524
Uganda 31 63 28 67 0.9 1.1 471
Average: 22 55 26 66 1.2 1.2 451
Piketty (2014):
US 20 48 34 71 1.7 1.5 48,377
Britain 15 42 28 70 1.9 1.7 38,363
France 9 33 24 62 2.7 1.9 40,706
Sweden 7 28 20 59 2.9 2.1 52,076
Average: 12 37 27 66 2.3 1.8 44,880
Notes: The construction of the micro measures of household income and wealth for all SSA countries is discussed
in Section 2, with further details in the Online Appendix. The figures for rich and emerging countries are retrieved
from Piketty (2014). All numbers refer to 2010, except for Argentina, which refers to 2005. The macro measures
of income per capita in current USD retrieved directly from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
Taking the ratio of the share of total wealth held by the top 10% of the wealth distribution
to the share of the total income earned by the top 10% of the income distribution we find a
ratio of 1.2 in Malawi, 1.4 in Tanzania, and 1.1 in Uganda. This implies an average ratio for
our SSA countries of 1.2. Because we lack housing wealth in Tanzania (which is more equally
distributed than non-housing wealth) the ratio for Tanzania is likely to be an upper bound. In
any case the ratios for the top 10% of the marginal distributions of wealth and income in SSA
countries are lower than those in rich countries: 1.5 in the US, 1.7 in Britain, 1.9 in France, and
2.1 in Sweden. Focusing on the comparison between Malawi and the US, there is (1.5-1)/(1.2-
1)=2.5 times more transmission from income to wealth in the US than in Malawi. On average,
the ratio for rich countries is 1.8 which compared to 1.2 in SSA implies that there is four times
more transmission from income to wealth in rich countries than in SSA using the top 10% of the
marginal distributions of income and wealth. Focusing on the top 1%, the marginal distributions
imply that the transmission from income wealth in rich countries is more than six times larger in
rich countries than in SSA.
The transmission from income to wealth can be important for aggregate development (Galor
and Moav, 2004). If high levels of wealth inequality are a necessary part of the growth process
at early stages of aggregate development, then it seems that none of the three SSA countries
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that we study is ready to experience a growth takeoff yet. To see this, note that the current
concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution in the SSA countries that we study is much
lower than that attained by developed countries when these economies were experiencing growth
takeoffs and industrialization. In 1810 Britain the top 10% and top 1% of the wealth distribution
held 82% and 53%, respectively, of the total wealth; in 1810 France these figures were 80% and
46%, and in 1810 Sweden 83% and 57% (Piketty, 2014).
As noted earlier, inference from the marginal distributions is limited by the fact that households
at the top of the consumption, income, and wealth distributions are not necessarily the same. To
overcome this caveat we study the wealth distributions conditional on the income distribution.
We find that the top 10% income-rich households hold 27% of total wealth in the rural areas of
Malawi and 49% in the urban areas (panel (a2) and (b2), Table 5). In contrast, the top 10% of
the income distribution holds 60% of total wealth in the US (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011). This
implies a substantial difference in the ability to accumulate wealth, given income, between Malawi
and the US, particularly for rural Malawi. This differential is largest for the top 1% income-rich
households, who hold 26% of total wealth in the United States, but merely 4% of total wealth
in rural Malawi and 11% in urban Malawi, which implies a nationwide average of 5% for Malawi.
The top income-richest 1% households in Malawi hold a share of total wealth that is one-fifth of
its US counterpart. This implies that the transmission from income to wealth is five times larger
in the US than in Malawi, a number that is twice the one obtained using the ratio of top 10%
shares of income and wealth from the marginal distributions.
Regarding the joint distribution of consumption and income. The top 10% income-rich house-
holds account for 21% of total consumption in rural Malawi (panel (a2), Table 5), while the top
10% income-rich households account for 30% of total consumption in urban Malawi (panel (b2),
Table 5). Similar insights arise if we focus on the top 1% of the income distribution which account
for 3% of total consumption in rural areas and 6% of total consumption in urban areas. That is,
again, using the top shares of the income distribution, we find evidence of less transmission from
income to consumption in rural Malawi than in urban Malawi.
Finally, an important aspect of the distribution of welfare in rich countries is that while the
wealth-poor households barely contribute to aggregate savings, they hold a large share of total
consumption (Krueger et al., 2017). We find that this is also the case in SSA countries. In
SSA, the distribution of consumption conditional on wealth is even less dispersed than in the US
(panel (a), Table 7). The top (bottom) 20% of the wealth distribution consume 35% (15%) of
total consumption in Malawi and 37% (11%) in the US. Focusing on the bottom 40% of the
wealth distribution, who barely hold any wealth in Malawi and the US (Table 5), we find that
they consume 29% of total consumption in urban Malawi, a similar share than the 23% obtained
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Table 7: Consumption by Wealth and Land Partitions, Malawi (ISA 2010)
Bottom(%) Quintiles Top(%) All
0-1 1-5 5-10 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 10-5 5-1 1 0-100
(a) Cons. by Wealth Partition: Shares of Total (%)
Malawi:  Rural 1 3 4 15 15 18 21 31 8 10 2 100 Urban 1 2 2 11 15 17 19 38 9 12 4 100 Nationwide 1 3 4 15 14 16 20 34 8 11 4 100
US 1 3 3 11 12 17 22 37 9 8 3 100
(b) Cons. by Land Partition (Rural): Shares of Total (%)
Unconditional 16 - - 21 16 17 20 26 6 8 2 100
If Land>0 1 3 4 17 16 19 22 27 6 8 2 100
Notes: All variables are averages in current USD. The construction of the measures of household consumption,
income, and wealth is discussed in Section 2, with further details in the Online Appendix. The results for the US
quintiles are directly borrowed from Krueger et al. (2017) using 2006 PSID data, and we added our results for
the top and bottom 10% of the wealth distribution using their data.
for the US. In rural Malawi, the wealth-poor (the bottom 40%) consume an even larger share of
consumption, 31%. Indeed, we find a strikingly uniform distribution of consumption conditional
on land, the main asset in rural areas (panel (b), Table 7), with the bottom 40% of the land
distribution accounting for 36% of total consumption. This is true whether we condition on
positive land assets or not. This suggests that the ex-ante distribution of nonmarketed land is
likely to be used to partly mitigate consumption inequality.
4 Further Insights
First, using panel data, we study whether the current patterns of income mobility can help
explain the inability to accumulate wealth in SSA, in particular in rural areas. Second, we
use the consumption and income panel data to conduct consumption insurance tests in rural
and urban areas. Third, we provide direct empirical evidence of informal ex-post redistribution
mechanisms that are stronger in rural areas than in urban areas through food gifts and self-
reported copying strategies. We also discuss the ex-ante redistribution of land as consumption
insurance mechanism. Fourth, we show the availability of more formal borrowing in urban areas
than in rural areas. Formal borrowing is largely devoted to productive activities (e.g., start a
business) rather than for consumption insurance purposes.
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4.1 Insights from Income Mobility
We have seen that the top 10% income earners hold 39% of total wealth in rural Malawi and
59% in urban Malawi, which yields a nationwide average for Malawi of 49%. This figure is much
larger, 70%, in the US (D´ıaz-Gime´nez et al., 2011). The savings rate for the top 10% of income
earners, computed as one minus the expenditure rate of disposable income, is 30% in rural Malawi
and 35% in urban Malawi, which is similar to the saving rate for the top 20% of income earners
in the US, 37.5% (Krueger et al., 2017). In this context, why are the top income earners in SSA
not able to accumulate wealth despite high saving rates? Note that wealth accumulation is the
result of past saving behavior and, hence, at saving rates similar to those of the US, the top
income earners in SSA will accumulate sizable wealth only if they remain at the top for a period
of time comparable with their US counterparts. This implies that the study of income mobility
can help, at least partially, reconcile these two facts—high saving rates but relatively low wealth
accumulation for the top income earners in SSA.
We compare SSA income mobility to the US in Table 8. The SSA sample pools the panel
data from three countries: ISA data for Malawi 2010-13, Tanzania 2008-10, and Uganda 2009-11
(see the Online Appendix C for a country-by-country analysis). Before pooling the data we divide
each country-year sample by its sample mean. This implies a total sample of 6,640 households
for SSA. The bottom panels (b) refer to the US. The US sample is the 2004-06 PSID with a
size of 5,649 households. There are several findings to note. First, there is substantially more
persistence at the top of the income distribution in the US than in SSA with 76.17% of households
in the top quintile remaining in that quintile after 2 years in the US and 52.41% in SSA. That
is, the chances of remaining at the top quintile of the income distribution after two years are
roughly 50% higher in the US than in SSA. There is also larger downward mobility in SSA than
in the US with 4.52% of households in the top quintile moving to the bottom quintile in SSA,
and barely 0.62% in the US. That is, the chances of moving from the top to the bottom quintile
of the income distribution are roughly 6 times larger in SSA than in the US. Second, there is
substantially more persistence in the bottom of the income distribution in US than in SSA as
73.19% of households in the bottom quintile remain in that quintile after two years in US while
this figure is 41.87% in SSA. That is, the chances of remaining at the bottom of the income
distribution after two years are roughly 75% higher in the US than in SSA. There is also larger
upward mobility in SSA than in the US with 5.27% of households in the bottom quintile moving
to the top quintile in SSA, and barely 0.18% in the US. That is, the chances of moving from the
top to the bottom quintile of the income distribution are almost 30 times larger in SSA than in
the US.31 Focusing on the diagonal elements of the transition matrix SSA and the US both show
31The mobility of top and bottom 1% and 10% show similar relative movements.
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0-1 0-10 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 90-100 99-100
0-1 2.99 29.85 34.33 20.90 17.91 14.93 11.94 2.99 0.00
0-10 1.36 26.05 46.39 24.25 13.10 10.69 5.57 2.11 0.15
Q1 1.43 23.95 41.87 26.51 15.81 10.54 5.27 2.03 0.23
Q2 1.13 11.60 25.98 27.71 23.64 15.89 6.78 2.11 0.15
Q3 1.13 8.28 17.7 21.31 26.51 23.12 11.37 4.22 0.23
Q4 0.90 3.99 9.94 16.64 21.54 27.71 24.17 10.02 0.30
Q5 0.45 2.18 4.52 7.83 12.5 22.74 52.41 31.63 4.07
90-100 0.30 1.81 3.16 5.42 9.49 18.83 63.10 45.18 7.23





0-1 0-10 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 90-100 99-100
0-1 22.81 75.44 87.72 7.02 1.75 0.00 3.51 3.51 0.00
0-10 6.90 61.24 82.83 12.39 3.89 0.53 0.35 0.35 0.00
Q1 3.81 41.59 73.19 20.53 4.78 1.33 0.18 0.18 0.00
Q2 0.88 6.02 20.35 53.27 20.18 5.13 1.06 0.53 0.00
Q3 0.18 1.68 4.07 20.27 52.57 18.85 4.25 1.50 0.18
Q4 0.00 0.35 1.77 3.89 18.58 57.43 18.32 4.16 0.09
Q5 0.18 0.35 0.62 2.04 3.90 17.27 76.17 43.58 4.69
90-100 0.18 0.35 0.89 1.95 2.30 7.45 87.41 69.86 8.69
99-100 1.79 1.79 1.79 0.00 3.36 3.57 89.29 83.93 51.79
Notes: The top panel (a) refers to SSA. The SSA sample pools panel data from three countries: the ISA data for
Malawi 2010-13, Tanzania 2008-10, and Uganda 2009-11. Before pooling the data we divide each country-year
sample by its sample mean. This implies a total sample of 6,640 households for SSA. The bottom panel (b) refer
to the US. The US sample is the 2004-06 PSID with a size of 5,649 households.
an inverted-U shaped pattern. There is an asymmetry: the top 20% are more persistent than the
bottom 20% in both SSA and the US. That is, there is more upward mobility than downward
mobility in both economies, althouhg more prominently in SSA than in the US.
The large sample size allows us to also explore the mobility of the top and bottom 10% and
1% of the distribution in both SSA and the US. In SSA, 25.76% of households at the top 1% of
the income distribution remain at the top 1% after two years, while this figure is more persistent,
51.79%, in the US. Chances of moving from the top 1% to the bottom quintile are also larger in
SSA (4.55%) than in the US (1.79%), suggesting again larger downward mobility in SSA than
in the US. The top 10% of the income distribution shows similar insights, higher persistence in
the US and larger downward mobility in SSA. Focusing on the bottom of the distribution, 2.99%
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of households at the bottom 1% of the income distribution remain at the bottom 1% after two
years, while this figure is much more persistent, 22.81%, in the US. Chances of moving from
the bottom 1% to the top quintile are also larger in SSA (11.94%) than in the US (3.51%),
suggesting again a larger upward mobility in SSA than in the US. The top 10% of the income
distribution also shows higher persistence in the US and larger downward mobility in SSA.
An isomorphic representation of the income mobility matrix is in the conditional transition
probabilities depicted Figure 4. The vertical axis refers to the quintile of origin in the transition
and the horizontal axis shows the conditional transition probability to a destination quintile iden-
tified with the colors labeled at the bottom of each figure. The left panels show the transition
probabilities using the quintiles of the income distribution as origin, the center panels use the
income deciles as origin, and the right panels use the income percentiles as origin. The top panels
refer to SSA and the bottom panels to the US. In all cases there is clearly more income persistence
in the US than in SSA across the entire income distribution. For example, the chances of being in
the bottom quintile of the income distribution after two years (blue color in all panels) are more
skewed to the top of the original distribution of income in SSA than in the US. That is, there
is a nontrivial chance of ending up in the bottom quintile from the entire origin distribution of
income in SSA (roughly 5% from the top decile, 10% from the median of the distribution, 40%
from the bottom decile, and 45% from the bottom 5%), while these transitional probabilities
are much smaller for the US from the top of the original distribution of income (less than 0.5%
from the top decile, less than 1% from the median of the distribution) and much larger from the
bottom of the original distribution of income (85% from the bottom decile, and 90% from the
bottom 5%). The opposite occurs for the chances of being at the top quintile of the income
distribution after two years (red color in all panels) as the conditional probability is more skewed
to the bottom of the original distribution of income in SSA than in the US.
Finally, there are important income mobility differences in rural and urban areas. We find a
higher persistence of income in urban areas than in rural areas along the entire income distribution
for Malawi, (see the Online Appendix C). This is evident from the diagonal elements in the
mobility matrix that accumulate larger mass in urban areas than in rural areas, except for the
bottom quintile of the distribution. Focusing on the bottom (i.e., first) quintile of the distribution,
we find similar levels of persistence in rural and urban areas, 33.88% and 34.58% respectively.
However, conditional on leaving the bottom quintile of the distribution there is larger upward
mobility in rural areas than in urban areas as 8.84% of those who leave the bottom quintile in
rural areas move to the top quintile, while this figure is almost half 4.72% in urban areas.32
32In the Online Appendix C, we show analogous income mobility matrices for Tanzania and Uganda. We also
show an alternative measure of mobility based on the predicted future income ranking of households given the
current income ranking. We find similar insights as those from mobility matrices and transition probability plots.
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Figure 4: Income Transition Probability Plots: Sub-Saharan Africa vs. the US
(a) Sub-Saharan Africa
(a1) From Quintiles to Quintiles (a2) From Deciles to Quintiles (a3) From Percentiles to Quintiles
(b) United States
(b1) From Quintiles to Quintiles (b2) From Deciles to Quintiles (b3) From Percentiles to Quintiles
Notes: The top panels (a) refer to SSA. The SSA sample pools the panel data from three countries: ISA data for Malawi 2010-13, Tanzania 2008-10, and
Uganda 2009-11. Before pooling the data we divide each country-year sample by its sample mean. This implies a total sample of 6,640 households for SSA.
The bottom panels (b) refer to the US. The US sample is the 2004-06 PSID with a size of 5,649 households. The vertical axis refers to the quintile of origin
in panels (a1) and (b1), the decile of origin in panels (a2) and (b2), and the percentile of origin in panels (a3) and (b3). In all panels the horizontal axis
shows the conditional transition probability to each destination quintile identified with the colors labeled at the bottom of each figure.
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4.2 Complete Markets Tests
Panel data on consumption and income allows for the computation of insurance tests a` la
Townsend. In particular, we can test the idea that there is more consumption insurance in
rural areas than in urban areas. Therefore supporting the cross-sectional evidence in Section 3.
To this end, we conduct complete markets tests, as proposed in Townsend (1994), using the
following econometric specification: ∆lncit = β∆lnyit + Θxit + εit, where consumption growth
is the log difference ∆lncit = lncit+1 − lncit, income growth is ∆lnyit = lnyit+1 − lncit, and xit
includes a wide range of household controls such as age, dummies for education, regions, sex,
marital status, and household size. The idea is that if the Townsend-β is significantly different
from zero, we reject the hypothesis of complete markets, and accept it otherwise. Our results
are in Table 9.
First, we use growth in total nondurable consumption as the endogenous variable for urban
and rural areas respectively in Columns (1) and (2). In both cases, urban areas and rural areas
significantly violate complete markets. This feature is more salient in urban areas than in rural
areas as 12.3% of income growth translates into consumption growth in urban areas and 9.8%
in rural areas. Quantitatively, it is not clear what it means that one Townsend-β is larger
than the other, besides suggesting that rural areas are closer to complete markets (hence, full
insurance) than urban areas. Second, our measure of household nondurable consumption can
mask the presence of insurance as it includes variation in prices as well as non-food items that
are perhaps harder to measure correctly. To help overcome this difficulty the last four columns
(3)-(6) use growth in caloric intake as the endogenous variable. In this case 5.1% of income
growth significantly transmits to caloric intake growth in urban areas when we use the full sample
of households, Column (3). In sharp contrast, we cannot reject complete markets in rural areas
with a nonsignificant transmission of 0.5% from income to caloric intake, Column (4). Rural
households seem to be able to perfectly insure caloric intake against idiosyncratic income risk.
This result is even starker if we focus on the most vulnerable households defined as those where
income growth is less than median growth. In this case 10.5% of income growth significantly
transmits to caloric intake growth in urban areas (Column (5)), while again we cannot reject
complete markets in rural areas.
Our results add value to the notion that there is more consumption insurance in rural areas
than in urban areas in poor countries, which is not new in other settings. For example, this
is consistent with the idea that migrating the city implies a loss of insurance due to higher
unemployment risk as in Harris and Todaro (1970) or the loss of casts networks as in Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2016). Recently, Santaeula`lia-Llopis and Zheng (2018) also find higher levels
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Table 9: Complete Markets Tests: Insurance in Rural and Urban Areas, Malawi ISA 2010-13
Nondurables Calories Calories (< p50)
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Consumption Growth: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income Growth (β) 0.123*** 0.098*** 0.051*** 0.005 0.105*** -0.020
Household Controls X X X X X X
Observations 515 1,767 550 1,808 270 885
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) use growth in total nondurable consumption as endogenous variable separately for
urban and rural areas, respectively. The last four columns (3)-(6) use growth in caloric intake as endogenous
variable where columns (3) and (4) use the full sample, and columns (5) and (6) use only the sample of households
where income growth is less than its median growth. Our econometric specification is ∆lncit = β∆lnyit +
Θxit + εit, where consumption growth is the log difference ∆lncit = lncit+1 − lncit and income growth is
∆lnyit = lnyit+1 − lncit. The household controls include age, dummies for education, regions, sex, marital
status, and household size. We denote significance at 1% level with ***, 5% with **, and 10% with *.
of consumption insurance in rural areas than in urban areas in growing China. To the best of our
knowledge, our results are the first showing empirical evidence of higher consumption insurance
in rural areas than in urban areas in SSA countries. In particular, we cannot reject the presence
of complete markets in rural areas when we define consumption in terms of caloric intake.
4.3 Informal Redistribution Mechanisms
We study two types of informal redistribution mechanisms, ex-post and ex-ante. First, we study
self-reported copying strategies (mutual insurance versus self-insurance) in response of adverse
income shocks. Second, we study the distribution of land in rural areas which is achieved through
non-market channel and can be interpreted as an ex-ante redistribution mechanism.
4.3.1 Ex-Post Redistribution: Self-Reported Insurance
During the 12 months of the Malawi survey, in rural areas, 43% of households have suffered an
aggregate shock, 6% an idiosyncratic shock, and 22% both types of shocks, leaving 29% of the
population without shocks. The most common aggregate shock in rural areas is rain, 43% of
households report a rain shock (too little or too much), followed by agricultural costs (33%) and
food prices (26%).33 In urban areas, 15% of households have suffered an aggregate shock, 13%
an idiosyncratic shock, and 11% both types of shocks in the past 12 months, leaving 61% of
33Here we define rain as a type of aggregate shock, but we acknowledge there is rainfall dispersion across
households. If we redefine rain as an idiosyncratic shock, then we find that in rural areas 14% of households have
suffered only an aggregate shock, 25% only an idiosyncratic shock, and 31% both types of shocks in the past 12
months. The planting of maize needs to be timely. Rains that come too early or too late are as problematic as
droughts and floods. Our measure of shock includes all these possibilities.
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the population without shocks (basically twice as much as in rural areas). The most common
aggregate shock in urban areas is unexpected high food prices, reported by 18% of households,
which highlights the tight link between rural and urban areas. In both rural and urban areas,
health shocks are the most important idiosyncratic shocks, followed by death and theft.
We group insurance mechanisms into “no insurance”, “self-insurance”, and “mutual insur-
ance”.34 We focus on what households declared as their main coping strategy. The items “no
insurance”, “mutual insurance”, and “self-insurance” do not sum to 100%; instead, they sum up
to the percentage of households that reported having a shock. Precisely, in rural areas, where
71% of households reported suffering a shock: 35% of total rural households reported using no
insurance to deal with that shock, 28% reported some form of self-insurance, and 7% reported
some form of mutual insurance. In urban areas, where 39% of households reported suffering a
shock: 22% of total urban households report using no insurance, 15% reported some form of self-
insurance, and 2% reported some form of mutual insurance. That is, in rural areas, 35/71=49%
of households report not using an insurance mechanism conditional on having reported a shock,
while this figure is slightly higher (22/39=56%) in urban areas. This is suggestive, again, of a
worse ability to provide insurance in urban areas than in rural areas.35
4.3.2 Ex-Ante Redistribution: Acquired vs. Inherited Land
The somewhat uniform distribution of consumption conditional on land in rural areas (Section 4.1)
suggests that the distribution of land helps reduce consumption inequality. If the wealth-rich are
land-rich, then limitations to accumulate wealth at the top of the distribution (Section 3.4) are
potentially mirrored by limitations to accumulate land. For example, the ability to accumulate
wealth can be limited by access to land markets. Thus, it is important to distinguish between
land that is acquired through the market, and land that is distributed outside the market, i.e.,
through inheritance or other mechanisms.36
The share of the rural population that owns land is 87%. This number increases with wealth
from 60% for the bottom quintile of the wealth distribution to 95% for the top quintile. That
34Self insurance includes savings, dietary restrictions, market labor, own labor (working in the family-owned
farm), credit and selling of assets. Mutual insurance is almost exclusively family/friends help within the village; the
percentage of households that report receiving mutual insurance from children living elsewhere or from government
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is negligible in both rural and urban areas.
35Across the CIW distributions we find that households that self-report “mutual insurance” as a coping strategy
tend to be at the bottom of the income distribution, while those that report “self-insurance” populate the top of
the income distribution. This is consistent with our results on the larger ability to accumulate wealth in the top
of the income distribution than in the rest of the economy, see our the longer version of this paper (De Magalha˜es
and Santaeula`lia-Llopis, 2015).
36Restuccia and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2017) find that land markets are related to the degree of misallocation. If
determined by markets, the allocation of land is several times more efficient than otherwise.
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is, the wealth-rich are indeed land-rich. Conditional on owning land, we find that the share of
land value that has been inherited represents 81% of the total value of land holdings. This figure
is similar to the proportion of inherited wealth in the total wealth for France in the nineteenth
century (Piketty, 2014). This proportion barely declines as we move from the bottom quintile
of the wealth distribution, 84%, to the top 1%, 75%. The low amount of marketed land at the
top of the wealth distribution suggests that merit plays little role on the accumulation of land
(and wealth) in SSA. Similar insights arise if we focus on a broader measure of nonmarketed land
that includes inherited land, land granted by the chief, and land acquired as bride price. The
proportion of nonmarketed land represents 97% of the total value of land (i.e., only 3% of land
is bought or rented in the market). This proportion barely changes with wealth, from 98% in the
bottom quintile of the wealth distribution to 95% at the top 1% of the wealth distribution. This
is a key mechanism that prevents households to accumulate wealth in SSA: the main source of
household wealth, land, is simply not for sale.37
4.4 Formal Borrowing, Need and Self-Selection
An alternative mechanism to insure consumption is formal borrowing (e.g loans). However, this
argument strictly depends on whether households use loans to insure consumption. In contrast,
if loans are used to finance risky investments/growth (e.g., start a business), then the effects
of formal borrowing on consumption insurance are less obvious. In ISA, households are first
asked whether they have applied or not applied for a loan in the past year. Second, whether
they succeeded in receiving the loan and the amount borrowed. Third, whether or not a loan
was needed. This allows us to construct direct measures of how many household are credit
constraint (households that were turned down after applying for a loan) controlling for self-
selection (households that did not apply for a loan, even when needing one, because they thought
they would not get it).
Only a small proportion of total households report receiving a loan: 13% in rural areas and
20% in urban areas. Nevertheless, a large part of the population is in need of loans, in particular in
rural areas. A slightly higher percentage of households report needing a loan in rural areas, 75%,
than in urban areas, 67%. The main reasons for not applying for a loan when needing one are
“not knowing any possible lender” and “having no collateral”. The application rate conditional
on needing a loan is 26% in rural areas and 40% in urban areas. Accordingly, the success rate
37For Tanzania and Uganda this also appears to be the case. In Tanzania there is a question on whether
the household holds any documentation of ownership for their dwelling (not specifically land): 75% have no
document, 25% do but these include inherited property, traditional occupancy, and allocation by village chief as
well as property bought in the market. In Uganda the government encouraged the formalization of ownership,
but this is not widespread as discussed in McAuslan (2003).
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conditional on needing a loan are 17% in rural areas and 30% in urban areas. This way, the ability
to borrow, proxied with success rates conditional on need, is roughly twice larger in urban areas
than in rural areas.38 The larger ability of urban households to borrow does not necessarily imply
more consumption insurance in urban areas than in rural areas. To link credit to consumption
insurance we must look into the reasons for borrowing. In the ISA survey there are 3.6 times
more loans acquired for start-up capital than for consumption in urban areas. This ratio is much
less, 1.6, in rural areas. This suggests that households formal borrowing is mostly used to target
production activities rather than for consumption insurance, and this feature is more salient in
urban areas than in rural areas.
5 Conclusion
From a macroeconomic perspective, the inequality and joint behavior of consumption, income,
and wealth in the very poor countries that we study can be summarized by two findings: (i) a
low transmission from income to wealth and (ii) a low transmission from income to consumption.
These findings are stronger in the rural areas than in the urban areas of SSA. First, we relate the
low transmission from income to wealth to a large inability to save and accumulate wealth in rural
SSA compared with urban SSA, and in SSA compared with other world regions. Second, the
low transmission from income to consumption suggests that despite being unable to persistently
save—and hence, self-insure—SSA households are able to insure their consumption relatively
well. Such a phenomenon requires the presence of powerful insurance arrangements, particularly
in rural areas. The coexistence of these two findings (i)-(ii) reveals a negative relationship—and
potentially a trade-off—between accumulation and insurance for SSA. In particular, it raises the
question of whether the process of accumulation and growth potentially requires the disruption
of consumption insurance for SSA.
A natural next step is to understand the causes and implications of this negative relationship
between accumulation and consumption insurance along the growth path. In particular, a careful
quantitative assessment could benefit from incorporating the dynamics of consumption, income,
and wealth inequality that we document in macroeconomic models of poor countries. To this
end, we hope that our empirical study is informative to discipline heterogeneous agent versions of
38We can compare these figures to the US. The SCF in the US asks two similar questions: First, households
are asked if they are denied credit, and, second, they are asked if they did not apply for a loan for fear of being
turned down (Bricker et al., 2014). The fraction of households that say “yes” to one or both of these questions is
27% percent in 2013 in the US while this figure is 63% in rural Malawi and 47% in urban Malawi. This indicates
that there are roughly twice as many households credit constraint in Malawi as in the US. The composition is
also very different. In the US there are 19% of households that report not applying for fear of being turned down,
while this is 56% in rural Malawi and 40% in urban Malawi. Moreover, 16% of households in the US report being
turned down for a loan, while this figure is 7% in both rural and urban Malawi.
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macroeconomic models of growth and development (Galor and Weil, 1999; Hansen and Prescott,
2002; Gollin et al., 2002; Herrendorf et al., 2014).
This task faces some important challenges. First, in contrast to standard macroeconomic
models with heterogeneous agents that focus on explaining the observed high concentration
of wealth in rich countries (Castaneda et al., 2003; deNardi, 2004; Quadrini, 2000),39 our study
documents much lower wealth concentration for SSA, in particular, in its rural areas. Mechanisms
that prevent accumulation (e.g., no land markets) can help explain this lower concentration.
Second, the degree of consumption insurance provided in poor countries, in particular in rural
areas, is larger than what is typically achieved in standard incomplete markets models with
self-insurance (Carroll, 1997; Kaplan and Violante, 2010). For example, using caloric intake
to proxy consumption we cannot reject the complete markets hypothesis in rural areas, while this
is clearly rejected in urban areas. In addition, our evidence suggests that self-insurance (i.e., own
savings) is not a major force at play. A natural alternative model would incorporate endogenously
incomplete markets. Such models are typically used to assess mutual insurance in economically
poor settings. However, these models fall short in replicating the consumption and income (hence
wealth) distributions of village economies (Ligon et al., 2002). In this context, it is important
to note that matching these distributions, in particular that of wealth, is crucial to provide valid
macroeconomic inference on variables such as aggregate savings (Krusell and Smith, 1998) as
well as assess macroeconomic social insurance policy (Conesa et al., 2009). Third, the study
of heterogeneous-agent economies with idiosyncratic income shocks along the transition path is
always computationally challenging (Buera and Shin, 2011). To this computational difficulty,
we need to add the fact that the degree of market incompleteness is likely to change over the
aggregate stage of development as growing economies become less rural and more urban.40
Appendix
A Seasonal Adjustments
The vast majority of African countries, including Malawi, have strong seasonal variations in income and
consumption due to the fact that household consumption relies heavily on agricultural production. If data
are not collected with an annual reference period (i.e., one year recall), seasonality biases potentially
arise that jeopardize both representativeness and the study of inequality. This is usually the case of
consumption because data on consumption items are collected with recalls of the past 3 months, past
month, or even past week. One virtue of our Malawi LSMS-ISA data, with respect of previous LSMS data
sets, is that data have been collected evenly across 12 rolled-over months during the years 2004-2005
39The high concentration of wealth is a puzzle for the typical Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget-Imrohoruglu economies
as these models imply lower shares of total wealth at the top of the distribution than what is observed in the data.
40Along these lines, and focusing on a one-sector model transition for the US, Krueger and Perri (2006) propose
a model in which consumption insurance improves with aggregate output.
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and 2010-2011. This helps keeping track of seasonal changes in consumption patterns. This way, the
household survey average annualized consumption (i.e., the sum of monthly average consumption over
the whole year) is not subject to aggregation biases due to seasonal variation and is directly comparable
to aggregate annual consumption in national accounts. In contrast, inequality measures will still be
subject to seasonal bias if these measures are not stationary over the year. For example, it is natural to
think that household food consumption (that largely depends on agricultural production) differs largely
between the pre- and post-harvesting periods. This seasonal difference creates artificial inequality across
households simply generated by the fact the households are surveyed at a different month within a year.
Indeed, we find that households asked in the lean period (November-February) consume (on average)
about 2,626 (MKW) per week, while in the harvest season period average household consumption
is 3,291 (MKW) per week. Given our focus on inequality, to deal with artificial seasonal biases we
deseasonalize consumption items using a simple model that regresses period-average log-consumption




γs1s + υz,s,t, (2)




z log cz,s,t is the average consumption across households in year t, and γs predicts
the effect of seasonal dummies on (logged) average consumption. Precisely, this dummy captures the
growth rate change in average consumption.41 Here note that to identify γs we need observations for s
in at least two calendar years. For Malawi, we use LSMS-ISA 2004-2005 and 2010-201. Then, annual
household consumption for a household z that was interviewed in season s is constructed as
l˜og cz,s,t = υz,s,t ∗ 12.
If the reference seasonal period for a given type of consumption is a quarter, we multiply by 4.
B Units Conversion of In-Kind Items: From Pails to Kilograms using
Prices
In household surveys from poor countries it is standard to report amounts of consumption and agricultural
production in units that are not standard nor harmonized across time nor space. For example, in the
Malawi ISA, households are asked to report the amount they consume of a given item in any unit they
wish (e.g. bags, dishes, bunches, pails, or kilograms). It is then necessary to deal with the measurement
issue of converting all these reported units into a baseline unit, say kilograms. This is particularly
important for poor countries, where ‘self-farmed’ and ‘gift’ consumption represent about half (or more)
of the total value of food consumption. Once all items are converted to a baseline unit we can use
prices to estimate their monetary value.42 In our paper we have constructed a price-unit conversation
rate to put all reported units into a baseline unit. In this section we compare our new price-unit
conversion methodology with the standard physical-unit conversion methodology implemented by the
World Bank. The World Bank physically measured conversation rates with an additional market survey
in which field workers visited market-places across Malawi and physically measured the item specific
unit-conversion rates. In contrast, our methodology to construct price-unit conversion rates does not
require the collection of additional surveys.
41Attanasio and Weber (1993) offer an extensive discussion on why using the mean of the logs is preferable to
using the log of the mean. The second alternative suffers from an aggregation bias while the first does not.
42For Tanzania unit-conversion rates are not necessary as in Tanzania all quantities are reported in kg.
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Figure 5: Food expenditure: Price vs. Market conversion
Note: Density of estimated food expenditure using prices to convert units and using market weight measures.
We generate household-specific conversion rates using the information on prices by different house-
holds that bought the same item but reported purchased quantities in different units. We merge all
household-specific conversion from for 2004/05 and 2010/11. We pick the median conversion rate (if
there are at least 7) for each item-unit pair by subgroups of households. The subgroups are rural-north,
urban-north, rural-centre, urban-centre, rural-south, and urban-south. For a minority of rare items, the
subgroups are rural and urban. This is so in order to achieve at least 7 household-specific conversion
rates. With the resulting conversion rates, items are first converted into the modal unit, and then into
kg. The new price unit-conversion method that we suggest retrieves more item-unit pairs and allows
for more food items to be converted in to kg and added up to total consumption. Using our price
conversion rates we are able to retrieve 9,855 households with positive values of ‘own’ consumption,
while the number using the market-place physical conversion rates is 9,398. Similarly, the price conver-
sion retrieves 7,674 households with positive values for ‘gift’ consumption, while the number using the
market-place physical conversion rates is 6,082.
To make the comparison between the physical-unit conversion rates and our price-unit conversion
rates clear, we present the raw monthly value of consumption converted into dollars for the 2010 survey
only.43 In Figure 5 the solid line is the estimated food expenditure in logs when the price unit-conversion
rates are used; and the dotted line is the estimated food expenditure when the market-place physical
unit-conversion rates are used. In the right figure we plot the density of staple food expenditures
only (all maize, rice, cassavas, potatoes, banana, beans, and groundnut). For these staple items the
density generated by the price and market-place conversion units are virtually identical, except that
the price conversion in able to retrieve information for a few more households. In the left figure, we
can see that the density generated with the market-place rates has a slight leftward shift in relation
to the density generated with the price conversion rates. Again this is due to the price conversion
being able to pick up more item-unit specific conversion rates. There is little effect regarding inequality
43The food consumption values in this sub-section are not annualized, deseasonalized, or trimmed.
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measures as the distributions are very similar. Respectively for price and market-place unit conversion:
the average monthly consumption in US$ is 84.7 and 84.6, and the median is 62.8 and 58.7. Overall the
densities are very similar, but it must be noted that the use of the market-place unit-conversion rates
may underestimating consumption slightly.
C Measuring Unsold Agricultural Production
In agricultural economies such as the ones we study, assigning a monetary value to unsold agricultural
production is essential to the measurement of household income. Unsold production represents the
majority of total household production. We use maize in Malawi to illustrate this issue. First, we
convert maize production into the same unit to find that maize represents 69% of the total agricultural
production in kilograms. Most households produce maize as their main source of food and calorie intake,
but few sell it. Of the 9,280 households in the Malawi survey who report producing maize, only 1,618
(17%) report selling any maize and this proportion grows with income. Among the top 20% of the
income distribution in rural areas, 30% of households report selling maize; among the bottom 20%, only
6% sell maize. It is noteworthy that even the rich keep their own production for consumption. Also,
sales among the poor may indicate desperation rather than a good business strategy (Manda, 2010).
We need to assign prices to unsold production. The price at the gate is normally used for this
purpose (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). For valuing maize, this implies using the price of shelled maize
reported by households mostly in the immediate post-harvest season. There are two reasons this price
underestimates the value of unsold production. The shelled maize is a different good than what farmers
produce, as farmers use the cobs, husks, and stems for other intermediate purposes such as fuel,
animal feed, and as cover to protect soil from erosion. Such uses have an important monetary value
in subsistence households. Further, maize prices are lowest immediately after harvest (Kaminski et al.,
2014), whereas consumption takes place throughout the year. While the storage facilities are limited
(only 9% of households have a dedicated storage structure; most crops are stored in the house or in
open drums or sacks) almost all households report storing some maize for their own use later. This
suggests that storage adds value to maize when prices are high, and this option value is not captured
by the relatively low post-harvest price at the gate. For this reason, we use consumption prices to value
unsold agriculture production and the price-at-the gate to value sold production.
The underestimation of the value of production by the use of the price at the gate can be illustrated
by focusing on rural households that sell neither maize nor tobacco, tobacco being the main cash crop.
These are the households closest to an autarkic model, in which the maize they consume is what they
have produced. In this sample, the mean estimated quantity of maize produced is 124 kg and the mean
estimated quantity of maize consumed is 130 kg.44 Since the quantities of production and consumption
are similar, it becomes clear that assigning prices at the gate to production and consumption prices
to consumption can create an artificial wedge between their monetary values if these two prices differ.
Indeed, the price of shelled maize at the gate for these households is approximately US$0.16 per kg, and
the consumption price of green maize on the cob is approximately US$0.36 per kg. If we use the price
at the gate, the average estimated production value is US$22, which is less than half of the average
consumption value, US$47. That is, the price at the gate underestimates the value of unsold production.
In Figure 6 we compare the distribution of the monetary value in dollars of household total food
consumption in logs (dotted line) with the value of household agricultural production valued with
consumption prices (dashed line) and valued with the price at the gate (solid line). Since we are focusing
44For the entire sample of rural households these numbers are, respectively, 129 kg and 137 kg.
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Figure 6: Agricultural Production: Consumption Prices vs. Prices at the Gate
Note: The sample includes 4,385 households that sell neither maize nor tobacco and report producing a positive
value of maize and consuming a positive value of home-produced maize. These households represent 36% of the
entire sample and 45% of all rural households.
on households that sell neither tobacco nor maize and these are rural households close to subsistence,
one would expect the distribution of agricultural production and food to overlap. This is actually the
case in raw quantities and, hence, also the case if we value home production with consumption prices.
However, if we value production with prices at the gate, the total value of food production is estimated
to be considerably lower than food consumption. Even if we value production with consumption prices,
the distribution of the value of food production is slightly shifted left in relation to consumption. This
is to be expected as these households may have other sources of income, albeit small, such as informal
labor or received food gifts. In light of our results, it is our view that the shadow price of unsold
agricultural production is best captured by consumption prices.
Finally, the remaining issue is how to value the part of agricultural production that is actually sold
on the open market. We have chosen to use the price at the gate to value sold production as sold
items lose their storage value for the producer household, but this is of relatively small consequence
given the low share of sold production in the sample. The estimated average per capita value of maize
production for the sample of all rural households is US$101 under our preferred measure — that is, if we
use consumption prices for the unsold production and prices at the gate for the sold production. This
figure is US$109 if we use the consumption price for all production, sold and unsold.
D Recall Bias and Trimming
Food consumption is the lion’s share of household consumption in our settings and hence, this measure-
ment is perhaps the most important aspect of consumption. The ISA collection of food consumption
data is based on a 7-day recall questionnaire. These short-recall periods tend to yield better consumption
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measures (Beegle et al., 2012),45 but at a cost. Given that ISAs are spread over 12 months, the surveys
will do a good job in recovering average food consumption in the population, but they will potentially
do a poor job in measuring annual dispersion as part of this dispersion will be artificially due to sea-
sonal variation that needs to be net out for our purposes. Indeed, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda have
clearly demarcated lean and plenty seasons that largely determine food consumption. This shortcoming
can easily be dealt with using standard deseasonalization techniques to recover monthly consumption
dummies.46 Measurement error for other types of consumption such durables (collected with 12 month
recall) is still potentially present. We note, however, that durable consumption represents a minor share
of total consumption (4% in rural areas and 6% in urban areas; see below).
Income is based on recall of the entire production per crop and plot for the past two harvests. The
harvest referred to in the questionnaire may have taken place months earlier. We conduct robustness
testing for potential recollection bias for production using measures of household income only for those
households interviewed within 3 months after the rainy season harvest (which represents 93% of annual
agricultural production) has been completed (May, June, July); the mean and median of total agricultural
production in kilograms is virtually identical for these three months and for the yearly values.
Finally, our trimming strategy consists of two steps that mitigate the presence of outliers. As a
first step, we exclude households with zero calorie consumption or with an intake per person above the
maximum daily of 10,000 Kcal. As a second step, we trim clear outliers after a visual inspection by
subitems and then by aggregated measures. We finalize with an implied trimming of 2% of households
for Malawi and Tanzania and 4% for Uganda.47 The final samples for Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda
include, respectively, 12,015, 3,012, and 2,337 households.
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